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SECTION ONE 1-1 
INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that development projects, either financed locally or 
by international development agencies, invariably overrun their esti- 
mates both in cost and time. It appears that the overrun on such 
projects is greater than on private construction and in many cases^ 
greater on internationally financed projects than those paid for with 
local resources. The extent and reasons for these overruns are not 
well documented 0) and various attempts by agencies have proved 
inconclusive due to a lack of standardized costing procedures, the 
influence of inflationary cost increases and a natural reluctance of 
all organizations to partake in postmortem examinations of their 
construction projects.^) 
It is also a recurring problem for both public agencies in developing 
countries and aid organizations to spend the capital funds available 
within their budget period. The reason for this is the excessive 
gestation period for development projects from approval of a project 
to work commencement and the delays experienced during the construction 
period once work is underway. 
It is not the intention of this paper to quantify these increases in 
time and money but rather to discuss in general the various problems 
associated with such work and see how these overruns can be minimized. 
The various reasons for such problems have been appreciated for some 
time. In 1954 W. Lewis wrote: "It is surprising how frequently 
investment plans are frustrated merely by failure to ensure that the 
building industry can cope with the work which will be required of 
it .."(3) and in 1965 Walterson:- " unexpectedly high con- 
struction costs and long delays (due to) inappropriate specifications, 
poor siting, the use of defective or other improper materials and poor 
workmanship."(4) To these reasons can be added those of lack of 
standardization, inappropriate construction methods, and bureaucratic 
organizations not suited to the decision-making process involved in 
construction management. 
(1) The work of the "Operations Evaluation Department" of the I.B.R.D. 
is of note in this area. 
(2) The work of the "Operations Evaluation Department" of the I.B.R.D. 
carries out much needed review of development projects financed 
by that organization. However other-attempts by the Bank to 
review cost data such as in their "A Review of 62 Road Appraisal 
Reports 1960-66 - Economic Dept. Working Paper #5" were 
frustrated largely by non-standardization of costing procedures. 
(3) W.A. Lewis - Theory of Economic Growth. 
(4) W.A. Walterson - Development Planning: Lessons of Experience. 
John Hopkins Press Baltimore 1965. 
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There has been a notable lack of research in the field of administration 
of construction as compared with the work that has been done in such 
fields as design, the use of materials and other i terns which involve 
pre~constructi on decisions. ' Even in the field of economic planning and 
development, the majority of research has been into pre-construction 
decision making processes. 
It is particularly evident to those involved in both the design and 
construction phases of development projects financed by international 
agencies that, though these agencies involve themselves extensively 
in such activity as feasibility studies, the appointment and control 
of design consultants, and other pre-construction work, the actual 
augmentation of the construction phase is usually left entirely to 
some recipient organization with only minimal financial control and 
a complete lack of on-site involvement by the financial agency. Yet 
it is the on-site expenditures that cause most of the cost overrun 
and the on-site administration (or lack of it) that often cause 
excessive delay to augmentation — costs and delay which, in the long 
run, more than make up for any savings that may have been realized by 
much of the pre-construction studies, consultants' reports, etc. 
It is also not the intent i on of this paper to involve itself in the 
reasons for this apparent-lack of concern, though_from discussions 
with various agencies the problem is appreciated, and it appears that 
its solutions, as with most that are discussed in this report, are 
political and administrative rather than technical. 
This paper is a rationalization of the present state of the art of 
construction management in development-ortented construction projects 
built through international agencfes or with local financial arrange- 
ments. Within this framework an attempt is made to produce some 
general i zed recommendat-i-ons-as to how the existing system can be used 
to try to reduce construction costs and'delays. 
Though ii: is appreciatedthat fundamental changes in the whole structure 
of government and/or industry may be one method of cutting down these 
inherent problems, this would require attempts to change attitudes - 
and ways of 1 i fe that are not only outside the scope of this paper 
but of doubtful long-term effect. Recommendations have been made, 
therefore, to adapt rather than change, to accentuate the productive 
elements of the existing system rather than try to revolutionize the 
present methods. 
Construction augmentation may differ in detail and in nomenclature 
between different countries and different areas of the developing 
world but the similarities are fundamental and the generalities 
discussed appear justified. The observations in this paper are, 
therefore, theoretically applicable to al 1-construction activities, 
whether they be large or small, urban or rural, agricultural or 
industrial. Large construction projects, of a spectacular or complex 
nature, are, however, constructed on a one-time basis, often by 
international construction organizations and do not represent the 
average development scheme. This paper is concerned with smaller 
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continuing infrastructure type projects, such as housing, harbours and, 
because of the author's particular experience, rural roads and water 
supplies. 
The problems encountered in augmenting construction in these types of 
projects appear at first study to be various, but on analysis can be 
broken down to the following broad categories under which they are 
considered in this paper: 
1. Design with regard to construction realities. 
2. Administrative procedures for construction and the bureaucracies 
i nvolved. 
3. The material problem. 
1». Manpower and machine-power management. (Including labour-intensive 
constructi on.) 
5. Cost and schedule controls. 
The object of this paper is not so much to examine in depth each of these 
problems separately, but rather to consider the inter-dependence and 
inter-relationships that exist between these areas and to recommend (a) 
administrative procedures that will reduce the costs that are at present 
being experienced and (b) where necessary suggest areas that it would be 
advantageous to carry out more detailed research and study. 
In order to produce a reference point for this study it is necessary to 
define in broad terms the purpose of overseas development aid. This in 
itself is a large and fertile field of study and much has been written 
on the subject. This paper tries to avoid as much as possible the 
various political, sociological, and philosophical discussions associated 
with this topic and, therefore, the assumption is made that the ideal is 
to construct a facility as economically andin as short a time as 
practical, considering the political and social constraint imposed on 
the people whose duty it is to augment the project. The educational or 
"missionary" aspect of overseas aid has not been considered of any but 
passing importance in this presentation. 
The opinions and recommendations are the result of extensive personal 
experience in the management of construction in developing countries 
coupled with the study of various publications on this and related 
subjects and extensive interviews with government and agency officials, 
contractors, consul tants and others directly involved with the augmenta- 
tion and control of such projects. 
With such varied and, in many cases- prejudiced sources of information, 
it is-to be expected that the opinions gathered might be conflicting. 
An attempt has, however, been made to identify and rational ize a 
consensus of these ideas and produce a workable model that could provide 
an administrative vehicle for carrying out development construction for 
minimum cost ¡in minimum time. 
SECTION TWO 2-1 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the object of overseas development aid is to be considered as more 
than a handout of conscience money or missionary goodworks, but rather as 
an opportunity to provide facilities with which the recipient countries 
can increase their share of world-wide wealth, then one must be interested 
in providing these facilities as economically and as timely as possible. 
In order to do this the design of the facilities must be realistic in 
comparison to the financial and social conditions prevailing, the work 
must be carried out in a most expeditious way and one must be aware of 
the social and political realities within the country. 
The responsibility for ensuring this action is not only that of the 
governments of developing countries, who are themselves beset with 
prejudices, dogmas and political expediencies, but also that of the 
financial institutions and agencies who are providing funds. It is in these 
latter organizations' interest to produce the largest impact with the 
limited funds available and, unless they are prepared to take the initiative 
in this field, they may is well ship out ten dollar bills for distribution 
at the local cross-roads. 
The problems discussed within this paper are all administrative rather 
than technical and the principal solutions suggested are to simplify and 
standardize design and to put the responsiblity and also the necessary 
financial, technical and .managerial authority into the hands of one person 
(who is referred to as the project manager). At present these- 
responsibilities are divided at best between many people within a single 
augmenting agency and at worst between__a variety cof governmental _and~non— 
governmental organizations iwrthin.both the recipient and donor .countries. 
There is no one man who can be given the directive and necessary power to 
get the woi*k done on time with minimum cost outlay. 
In more detail the recommendations put forward are as follows: 
1. The design for overseas development projects must be standardized 
and simplified. Not only the physical design but also the specifications, 
tolerances, finishes and the legal requirements of construction must be 
standardized and simplified to allow advantage to be taken of pré- 
fabrication, repetitive structural construction and the use of local 
contractors. 
2. The designers (and not just the firms for which they work) of such 
development projects must be chosen not only for their expertise in the 
technical aspects of thei r design but also for their experience, in 
development work overseas in general, their knowledge of the local 
conditions and their willingness to learn from such experience and to 
undertake after construction evaluation as detailed below. 
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3. Full scale post-construction evaluations should be undertaken to 
identify the reasons for any cost and schedule overruns and to find 
the administrative or technical changes that can be augmented to 
minimize the future effects of these. This evaluation should be 
undertaken by a combined team consisting of the designers, the 
construction organization, the financial agency and the augmenting and 
operational agencies involved. The results of these appraisals 
should be as widely circulated as possible. 
A. The construction management should be undertaken by a semi-autonomous 
construction manager or management team, reporting only at the highest 
level to the augmenting and financial agencies concerned. Such a 
project manager must have day-to-day control of all construction aspects 
of the project including labour, equipment, and supplies. He must 
also be given the necessary authority to carry out his prime 
responsibility to get the work done on time and at minimum cost. 
Suggested organizational and responsibi1 ity concepts of this position 
are outlined in the appendix to this report. 
5. Development projects of an infra-structure nature should be undertaken 
by a modified direct dabour concept under the direct control of the 
project manager as suggested in k above. Contracts should be limited 
to labour only, small unit-price type arrangements and specialized 
sub-contracts. Material acquisition and major equipment operation would 
come directly under the project manager's control. 
6. Major consideration must be given to restructuring the present methods 
of equipment and material acqui si-t ions, expediting and delivery. The 
use of government purchasing and shipping agencies (whether of donor 
or recipient countries) should be avoided. - It i s recommended that these 
duties be undertaken by the project manager with the necessary competent 
staff or outside commercial help provided. 
7. Labour-intensive construction projects should also be administered 
under a direct labour arrangement with control of all aspects in the 
hands of the project manager. 
8. Major construction equipment should be obtained by the project 
manager (by purchase or hire) and administered by him under the modified 
direct labour arrangement detailed in 5 above. Equipment should be of 
the multi-purpose type wherever possible and maximum utilization should 
be provided for by carry-over to additional projects where possible. 
Independent arrangement for the-supply of spares-should be mader 
9. Reporting techniques designed to attain maximum control of cost and 
schedule fluctuations should be instigated by both the augmenting and 
the financial agencies involved in the project, and the system set up 
whereby the project manager has both the responsibility and authority 
to act on such reports. 
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10. Estimates of construction costs, whether prepared by design consultants, 
augmenting agencies or the financial organization's own staff should be 
evaluated by an independent construction engineer experienced in the 
social, physical and construction environment at the site of the work. 
Such evaluation should be based on a total time/cost method rather than 
unit prices. 
Apart from the administrative recommendations detailed above there are 
certain aspects of the management of overseas development construction 
projects which in the author's opinion require further study and research. 
It is felt that such work would result in a better understanding of some 
of the basic problems involved and provide further detailed recommendations 
as to how such projects should be administered. The suggested study areas 
are as fol lows : 
1. Further detailed study into the exact organizational form in which the 
project management concept should be formed in specific developing 
countries. 
2. A study of the availability of qualified management personnel and 
supporting staffs within the service of developing countries' governments, 
within the international construction community at large and within 
private industry. Such a study should also obtain whether such people 
would be ameanable to limited contracts as project managers as suggested 
in this paper and the conditions under which they would accept such 
positions. 
3. Detailed study of a simple cost and schedule reporting system to provide the 
required advance information necessary for project-management to mitigate 
the effect of -fluctuât ions-in anticipated-costs and= schedules, - 
k. A study of productivity factors for various skilled and unskilled 
labour-in various-countries and areas within countries. Such factors 
are already used extensively by international contractors in the 
estimating of overseas work and would be invaluable to the international 
financial organizations in evaluating estimates for and negotiating 
construction costs on development contracts. 
5. A study, by a sociologist rather than an economist or an engineer, into 
the motivation of labour under labour-intensive construction conditions. 
Particularly the effect of a long term task-work on total productivity - 
and methods other than financial reward to stimulate productivity should 
be considered. 
6. Further study of non-conventional methods of labour-intensive project 
management such as the Indian "Land Army" and the Philippine 
"Work Brigades" should be undertaken. 
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The problems that beset the implementation of overseas development 
construction projects will, naturally, continue despite the most 
ambitious management organization and the most dedicated personnel, It 
is felt however, that if a rational approach can be taken towards using 
these recommendations, which have already proven successful under various 
operating conditions, much of the excessive cost overruns and construction 
delays at present being experienced can be controlled and that the much 
needed projects can be built more economically and in a more timely manner. 
SECTION THREE 
DESIGN WITH REGARD TO CONSTRUCTION REALITIES 
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Any discussion on the cost of construction must start with the design of 
the structure - all too often design engineers, even those attached to the 
most experienced design consultants, have a very superficial knowledge of 
construction techniques and, though such designers will assure one of their 
continuing attention to the construction aspects of their designs, anyone 
who has experience with augmenting them can give extensive examples where 
designs have been, if not impossible to construct, at least could have been 
designed in a manner which would have allowed a more economical method of 
construction without loss of structural integrity. The concept that 
"concrete is cheaper than brains" is still very prevalent in the design 
industry. This problem is even more apparent in overseas development work, 
particularly with design organizations not intimately familiar with local 
construction procedures, customs and skill availabilities. 
There are many such examples of design practices causing additional costs, 
some of the most obvious being the use of equipment and/or skills that are 
unavailable or in short supply in the area concerned, while others are more 
complex and in order to avoid, require an intimate knowledge of the local 
environment. Two examples, one obvious and one not so obvious, will suffice 
to show the type of problems that can be encountered and the additional 
costs they can involve: 
While working in one of the smaller Caribbean islands some years ago the 
author had to instal 1 some-pre-fabricated steel sections, -the largest of 
whictv-weighed -about ^000 lbs.-- not - a - great- we i ght-to han die--in a country . . 
where mobi Te cranes-are obtainable. -On this island there-was, in fact, a 
crane capableof handling this section, it was -however, permanentiy_used in 
the harbour and to move it to the bridge site would have necessitated closing 
down the port for about a week.- The sections were eventual instal led 
using jacks and a front-end loader - however, the cost was greatly increased 
over that which would have been necessary had the sections been smaller. 
Again in the Caribbean, at one of the larger islands, a water treatment 
plant was being built on an overseas aid programme, and designed by a well- 
known and competent Canadian firm of consultants. The step irons in all 
tanks, manholes, etc., were specified as being fabricated from 2iJI extruded 
aluminum, - a standard no doubt In Cañada. The local extruding "plant on the 
i si and,however, could only extrude to a maximum of 2£" which would have 
necessitated al 1 step irons being fabricated overseas. In this case the 
contractor brought the matter to the attention of the field supervision who 
changed the step irons to 2¿" with considerable savings in both time and 
cost. 
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Similar to the additional costs and delays caused by inappropriate design 
is a common habit of design firms to use standardized designs for such 
minor structures as pump houses, manholes, culverts, etc. The problems with 
this practice are two-fold. Firstly many firms do no more than "change 
the title block", which in the case of designers whose majority of work is 
in temperate climates has led to the building of roofs to support snow 
loads in the tropics and relief valves capable of handling temperature 
variations of a hundred degrees in countries which may have temperature 
variations of only 10 degrees. Secondly, the organization receiving the 
structure is unable to develop its own standard structures as every design 
organization with which it comes in contact inflicts its own standards. 
The reasons for these basic design errors on the part of designers is partly 
ignorance of the design criteria of their own standard structures and partly 
cost. When pressed, design firms will admit that, being profit-making 
organizations, they can only afford to do the same repetitive type of 
design unless other financial arrangements can be made. 
With regard to the standardization of design and repetition of structures, 
the design consultants are not the only ones at fault, as a surprising 
number of government authorities (i.e. road, water and sewer authorities) 
in developing countries have no standard designs of their own, and if they 
do, are very reluctant to force their consultants (or even their own 
desígn engineers) to make use of them.O) The reasons for this are numerous 
and some go to the very basis of the civil service system in these 
countries,but one is their continued dependence on outside designers and, 
especially in aid programme work, a feeling that as the financial agency 
is paying the designers the authority or ministry should not demand too 
mucb~at a technical leve4. 
There is an infamous water supply in West Africa that was originally built 
by the British and subsequently enlarged, first under a European 
country's aid programme and then by a North American. Not only did this 
one plant have three operating voltages but, it is understood, three 
different light bulb fittings. This of course gets into the field of tied 
aid, and the requirement of various aid programmes for the recipient country 
to purchase materials from the donor country regardless of previous historical 
patterns. This matter is, however, dealt with more fully in a later section 
of this paper. 
The over-design, from an engineering, economic and social point of view on 
projects in developing countries also contributes greatly to increased cost. 
The position, advocated particularly by some administrators in the field of 
(1) The use of "Modular Design" in the construction of low cost housing 
has been explored at great length in theory but i s still little 
used in practices. 
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low cost housing and water supplies, that the problems in these areas 
are so chronic that it is impractical to provide facilities in the 
quantities necessary of as high a standard as one might wish, is 
fortunately gaining more and more acceptance in all fields of develop- 
ment. The proposal is not often popular at the political level, where 
the concept of second or even third best is sometimes unacceptable. 
This, however, is not directly a construction problem and will not be 
pursued in this paper except to note that construction costs could be 
greatly reduced if design standards, such as tolerances and finish, 
were reduced more in keeping with the practical and financial limi- 
tations of the country in which the structure is being built and the 
social requirements of the facilities. It is appreciated that it 
would be unpopular to advocate second class answers to pressing first 
class social problems, but given the limited financial and technical 
resources available it might be better to build two miles of bad road 
and face the resultant maintenance problems than one mile of good road 
and develop no immediate social advantage. One cause of this over- 
design, apart from the natural desire to go first class, is the use of 
high-caljbre_international consultants designing elementary "low 
standard" structures which could be done by more junior design 
organ i zat ions. 
From the point of view of construction problems not only are the 
structural/architectural designs in many cases over-designed, but the 
legal engineering requirement of the building specification (in many 
cases excerpts from, or complete copies of, standard developed 
country packages) are far too complex for the type of work carried 
out and in marrycases for the level of education and technical 
competence to be found on the construction sites. 
There are many examples of minor pipellnè'projects-which hàve been 
burdened by Conditions of Contract, General Specifications, Detailed 
Specifications--and pages of detai led drawings, which: woul d do justice 
to a multi-million dollar power station. Not only do such documents 
more or less demand more sophisticated contractors than are necessary 
for the job, but worse still are little read or understood by owner, 
Engineer or even contractor until some problem arises - and then they 
are often found to be deficient for the local situation encountered. 
One cannot help feeling that certain designers measure the results of 
their labours in "pounds of paper" produced and this attitude is catered 
to by their acceptance by aid agencies and augmenting authorities. 
There are available many simple short tèchnical specifications suitable 
for minor works and, if the recommendations contained later in this paper 
with regard to the contract administration of these smaller projects is 
adhered to, the requirements (if there ever were any) for these complex, 
legal-engineering documents would be reduced considerably. The intro- 
duction of standardized fittings, minor structures and construction 
procedures by the augmenting authorities would also reduce the necessity 
for design consultants to produce the large number of documents at 
present being used. 
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Not only the sheer size of construction specifications must come in for 
criticism but also their content. There is a tendency in developed ^ ^ 
countries, particularly Europe, to produce "end result type specifications 
rather than "method type", and this prejudice against method type is 
carried over into design specifications for the development projects 
overseas. In an end-result type specification the designer specifies 
the result he requires (6,000 psi concrete, 90¾ compaction) and refers 
to some standard testing procedure, for example, "A.S.T.M." or 
"British Standard." In the method type, however, the actual method of 
producing the result is detailed (so many pounds of cement per cubic 
yard, so many passes wîtha specified roller etc.). 
The "end result type" of requirement is preferred by designers because 
they claim it allows them to be sure of their end product and also that 
it does not discriminate against prospective contractors because they do 
not have the specified equipment. However, the lack of sophistication 
on the construction site prevalent in the majority of developing countries 
together with the lack of communication and qualified testing laboratories, 
makes the former reasoning doubtful and a judicial allowance for alternatives 
by the site construction staff would remove the latter objection. One tends 
to feel that the real reasoning behind the preference is the designer's 
natural reluctance to assume any of the construction risks and place all 
such risks with the contractor. The Owner however is paying for these 
risks and also the cost of an unsophisticated contractor in tackling the 
unknown. 
At present the technical and legal specifications on smaller development- 
oriented projects are treated by the contractor as "a big stick" which can 
never be enforced for practical and-political reasons and they tend to 
become a formal window dressing. The responsibi1ity for obtaining 
the design requirements is therefore, by default, left to site management 
personnel. 
Should the requirements suggested with regard to project construction 
management contained in this paper be augmented, more and more of the construction 
risks will both practically and legally be placed on the site supervisory 
staff where they more rightly should and the use of "method type 
specifications" would become more acceptable. Such procedures should not 
on 1 y reduce .the design cost considerably (if only in paper used) but would 
reduce construction costs and time for the following reasons: 
1. Smaller specialized local contractors would be able to compete with 
the larger, often more expensive, organization - (See Section 3 for a 
further discussion of this problem). 
2. Standardized and/or repetitive structures would promote pre-fabrication 
of elements as well as the inherent savings due to repetitive work. 
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3. Many (particular smaller) contractors are intimidated by the 
sheer size of the paper work and increase their prices to cover the 
unknowns caused by something in the specification they do not 
understand. 
The problem discussed above with regard to design of smaller development 
projects has been recognized in a superficial sort of way by various 
development agencies. They have been clothed in such words as "local 
conditions" and "indigenous construction environment". The traditional 
method of trying to negate their effect has been the use of local associates 
by expatriate design consultants. Some development agencies have made such 
association mandatory while many others merely recommend it. A secondary 
advantage (or maybe the primary reason) is that such associations may 
help to train local consultants in the field of design - the missionary 
syndrome of foreign aid coming to the fore again. 
With a few notable exceptions, these associations have been failures. In 
many cases the local consultants are as guilty of as many of the design 
faults discussed above as their expatriate partners. Many of these local 
designers have less site experience than for example, North American 
designers, and their training, even at local technical institutes, is 
western-oriented and their ambition is often to emulate their expatriate 
counter-parts, warts and all. At best these local associated companies 
become a glorified drafting service and at worst, merely a representative 
to arrange site transport and look after the local necessities such as 
graft. Arguments put forward against such associations by the prime 
consultants, who are normally expatriate, are that their financial 
arrangements do not allow them the time to engage in any educational process 
and that the expertise available at the technical level from these 
associates is so limited and communication so slow, there is little 
advantage to them in such arrangements. The associated local engineers, on 
the other hand, complain that such arrangements take up a lot of their 
time without their obtaining very much technical involvement or financial 
reward. Many of them suggest that a more realistic arrangement would be 
for the local organization to be the prime consultant, using expatriate 
expertise if and when considered necessary, and this has been tried in some 
cases with encouraging results. 
This latter idea would provide more of an "education" for local engineering 
industries; it would however, conflict with the "donor country-content" 
requirements of certain aid organizations. 
Much has been written about the use of local materials in construction, 
particularly in the field of housing, however not so much has been done in 
the field of civil engineering construction. Perhaps in this case the 
architects are ahead of the engineers, the latter bound by their traditional 
conservatism and unfortunately by their training. Some work has been done 
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by organizations such as the United Nations in the use of soil cements and 
bamboo in civil construction (1) and by the Intermediate Technology Development 
Group of London; (2) however, in the design office lip service appears to be 
all that is paid to the idea of using local or traditional crafts and 
materials. As with labour-intensive work (which is discussed in detail in 
another section of this paper) part of the problem is the unwillingness on 
the part of the indigenous people (in this case engineers, civil servants 
and policy makers, as the actual craftsmen are seldom asked their views) to 
move, as they consider, backwards. Another reason is the reluctance on the 
part of design engineers to experiment with processes or materials that 
have not been tried and proved in developed countries. Yet it is possible 
to substitute soil cement for asphalt stabilized roads where cement is a 
local product and oil is not, and to substitute hand placed masonry retaining 
walls for reinforced concrete where both the cement and reinforcing steel 
have to be imported. 
In designing projects that are to be constructed using labour-intensive 
methods a completely new approach must be taken by the designer. The 
traditional concepts with, for example road alignment, compaction etc., 
have to be re-evaluated. Some research type work is being done in this 
field, particularly by the International Labour Officé (3) and the Bureau 
-of Public Highways in the Philippines, (A) however,the mechanics of the 
necessary design changes are relatively straightforward - it is the 
turn-around in concept and priority that is difficult to implement. As 
far as this paper is concerned it is only pointed out that projects that 
are to be constructed by 4 abour intensive xnethods_must_be so identi fied 
at the design stage (or even earlier at the preliminary concept stage) and 
designed accordingly. Some of the conflicting results being obtained 
by the people at present working on the economics.of la bourrjn tensive 
construction may be dueto the projects being studied-being original ly-; - 
conceived and designed for equipment-intensive operation, or if not 
actively designed for such operations, being designed in the traditional 
manner which, because of the training and technical bias of the engineers, 
(1) "The Use of Bamboo & Reeds in Building Construction" U.N. Pub. ST/SOA/113 
"Soil Cement its use in Building" U.N. Pub. ST/SOA/5^ 
(2) "Cements Little Brother Shows Indian Promise" New Civil Engineer 7 March '7^ 
A Design for a Medium Span Wooden Bridge in Kenya" Intermediate 
Technology Vol. 1 §b. 
(3) The Role of Design in the Choice of Road Construction Techniques 
G.A. Edmonds, 1.L.O. Geneva 1975- 
(4) Manual of Construction of Roads by Labour-Intensive Methods - Bureau of 
Public Highways Manila - (unpublished). 
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produces results which favour the traditional capital-intensive 
construction methods. In other words, it is unlikely that economic 
labour-intensive operations will be obtained on a project designed in the 
traditional manner any more than economical equipment operation could be 
obtained on a project designed for labour-intensive construction. Other 
aspects of labour-intensive construction and in particular its management 
are discussed at length elsewhere in this paper. 
In order to overcome some of the construction problems due to inappropriate 
design which are now being encountered, the following is proposed: 
a. Augmenting authorities (Ministries, Authorities, etc.,) and overseas 
development agencies should be more selective in the organizations 
they hire or approve to design projects in developing countries. 
Particularly small projects in which local rather than international 
resources are to be used. Not only should the firm have had experience 
in the particular specialty and country involved, but the individual 
design engineers and technicians should also have had this experience. 
b. Where local engineering capacity exists in the developing country 
(even if this is only in the form of expatriate companies) these 
should be given responsibility for detail design, with access to 
specialized expertise in other countries if necessary. 
c. Every effort should be made by operating authorities in developing 
countries to standardize their designs and documentation and to ensure 
such standards are adhered to by their own designers, their own design 
consultants, and those working for them through financial agencies. 
Where they do not have such standards, it would be a beneficial 
development project, worthy of international financing, to produce them 
and carry out the necessary administration for them to be used. 
(Due to the "continuing emergency" type of management practised by most 
of these organizations, it is the administration of policy directives, 
rather than policy itself, that gets lost in day-to-day operations). 
d. All development projects should be subject to a detailed post-mortem at 
some time shortly after the facility is completed (preferably after some 
operating experience has been gained). To such a report, not only the 
designers (in person rather than a representative of the company) but 
also the construction site staff, contractors and operating personnel 
should contribute. The object of this, amongst other things, would be 
to ga in an insight into the construction and operational problems 
inherent in the original design. The cost of such meetings it is felt 
should be borne by the designers, as it is they that are gaining the 
experience. However, when this is suggested they decline mainly from 
financial considerations. It may be advantageous for development aid 
agencies to finance such reports on projects which they finance. 
Considering the magnitude of "pre-construction", studies, visits, 
reports etc., that are at present carried out, an additional one after 
construction may be in order. 
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e. Finally there must be a trend to simplify design, drawings, specifications 
and the complexity of these projects. The mountains of paper that these 
construction projects now generate must be reduced. Guidelines in 
this direction should be published by international development 
agencies and their design consultants be made to conform. Fifty years 
ago simple infrastructure projects of this type were undertaken with 
little more than a sketch, a one page contract and a lot of good will. 
The construction industry, even in developing countries considers itself 
to have "progressed" beyond this and it would be hard to return, however 
it is something for which to aim. 
SECTION FOUR 
ADM INISTRATI ON PROCEDURES S THE BUREAUCRACIES INVOLVED 
As with any construction project, overseas construction projects can be, 
and have been, administrated in a variety of ways with various degrees of 
success - the decision as to the method of augmentation is often made on 
the basis of political expedience or preconceived industrial dogmas rather 
than any rational evaluation of the most efficient and least time-consuming 
methods of carrying them out. In order to carry out an evaluation of the 
most effective administration techniques, it is necessary to consider the 
available alternatives, the necessary bureaucratic and institutional 
organizations with which the project will be involved and the existing 
or imported expertise within these bureaucracies and within the construction 
industry. 
It is indeed difficult to generalize all these factors for all developing 
countries and various considerations will predominate in any particular 
case, however studies of the administrative problems in widely different 
situations have provided a remarkable consensus as to these problems and 
to proposed methods of overcoming them. 
The most widely used method of construction administration on development 
projects is the traditional (in Western developed countries) tender-contract 
method, where open or prequalified lists of contracting individuals or 
companies tender on large sections of the work. The lowest (or in some 
cases the most reasonable, based on complex evaluation systems) is awarded 
the work and from then on it is its responsibility to complete the work with 
only policing duties (in theory) being carried out by the augmenting 
authority or Its agents "- the Engineer. Variations on this method 
of administration are when certain materials are suppplied by the owner or 
when certain specialized sub-contractors are specified or nominated by 
him, but basically the responsibility for the day-to-day running of the 
job and for getting the work done and conforming to the letter and intent 
of the drawings and specification is left to the contractor with, as stated, 
the owner or his designated consultant having only policing powers though 
these may vary in detail from contract to contract. 
This method of construction is well entrenched in the western developed 
world where a highly developed construction industry exists, where a tradition 
of contract responsibility is inherent and where design criteria, 
construction methods and material procurement procedures are standardized 
and institutionalized. . It also undoubtedly has its place in the 
construction of vast development projects in less developed countries where 
international construction companies, international consultants and an 
independent augmenting authority are operating - though even on these there 
is a case to consider the modifications discussed below. It is doubtful, 
however, whether this method of construction administration is applicable, or 
even in some cases workable, in the majority of smaller infrastructure type 
construction projects being considered in this paper. Not only are the 
contractors involved in such works in many cases unable or unwilling to 
devote the necessary managerial, financial and technical resources to produce 
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an economical construction package but the bureaucracy involved in the 
owner's organization puts every frustration in the way of even the most 
dedicated contractor. There is, however, a dogma of the construction 
industry that this traditional method of tendering and construction 
management is the most economical. This dogma is now being questioned 
more and more in developed countries but is still well entrenched in many 
of the developing countries and particularly in international financial 
agencies. 
Apart from the administration problems involved in the tender/contractor 
method of augmentation, it is the basic adversity arrangement that comes 
into being once a contract is signed that causes the problems. The 
contractor, who is held to sometimes unrea 1 istic tender prices, attempts to 
do the work as economically as he is capable, often by the use of 
excessive delays and takes every opportuniiry to obtain additional revenue 
in the way of claims, extra work, etc., while the owner on the other hand 
attempts to force the contractor to perform his contract and is at best 
unsympathetic to his problems, frustrations and difficulties, many of 
them the fault of the owner himself. The other deficiency of this system, 
due to the inherent bureaucratic problems of the owner, will be discussed 
at length subsequently. 
Modifications of this basic tender-contract system are gaining popularity 
for larger public works and development type construction projects in 
North America. These are all geared to reduce the conflicts that are 
inherent in the traditional system and spread the construction risks more 
evenly between the owner and the contractor. The most popular and successful 
of these are the "target estimate contracts" in which the contractor works 
on a 'cost-plus' basis up to a total estimated cost (based on a complex 
system of lump sums and unit prices) and then participates with the owner on 
some percentage basis on any cost overruns or savings on this figure. 
Other modifications, with incentives of various types, are also 
gaining popularity particularly in the private development field. In all 
these systems, however, the prime contractor retains control of the work 
including sub-contractors and is responsible for the day-to-day management 
of the project. In these modifications the role of the owner's representative 
(or Engineer) becomes more complex and sophisticated than merely policing 
the contract and it requires a high calibre of management expertise on all 
sides. 
The use of these modifications in the construction of small overseas 
development projects is not recommended because of the inherent political 
difficulties of implementing any incentive or bonus system and, more 
important, the lack of management expertise on the part of the majority of 
contractors involved and the ability of the existing civil service 
bureaucracy to handle such contract arrangements. 
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The next major method of carrying out construction work, particularly 
infrastructure projects, repairs and other smaller projects is by direct 
labour (sometimes called force account). In this method the augmenting 
agency (or owner) obtains the materials, owns or leases the equipment and 
hires the labour directly. The actual methods of payment for such equipment 
and labour can vary from day wages to forms of piece-work or even larger 
scale "labour only" type contracts. This type of organization has been used 
for many years in some countries and where there is no construct ion industry 
as such, it is the only method of construction that is known. In these countries 
the system is highly institutionalized and. eff i ci ervt, particularly in any 
labour-intensive operation. (1) 
Direct labour work has, however, obtained unfortunate connotations of 
inefficiency and backwardness, particularly with international financial 
agencies. Though undoubtedly such an arrangement does lend itself to 
abuse, so does any contract system and like such system is only as 
efficient as its administration. Certain lending agencies will only grant 
funds to be spent in this way under emergency conditions. 
There appears to be no conclusive evidence, however, that direct labour 
construction methods are necessarily Inefficient, in-fact there are certain 
studies showing that it is at least no more costly.(2) It is, of course, 
always difficult to make true cost comparisons in such matters because 
direct labour work tends to be fragmented and also because many overhead 
costs are lost in the established costs of the augmenting agency or are 
hidden under engineering costs. 
Two interesting examples of overseas development work being carried out by 
systems of modified direct labour are worthy of comment: The first is 
the construction and reconstruction of sections of seawall protection in 
South America. Originally this project was bid by international tendering, 
the prices, however, were higher than anticipated and it was decided to do 
the work by a system of project management and modified direct labour. 
Apart from delays due to late procurement of equipment and materials (which 
doubtless would have involved claims for additional costs had the job been 
awarded to a prime contractor) the job has progressed satisfactorily and 
it appears will be completed at a cost below the lowest tender price. 
This job was, however, of a high risk nature, which may have caused the 
initial high tender prices - this is not the case in the next example. 
(1) The "Paquio" system used in the Phi 1ippines and the "Schedule - of - 
Work" system in Jamaica. 
(2) A Cost Comparison Study of Force Account and Contract Construction On 
Five Secondary Road Projects in North Carolina" Farrell & Kilpatrick. 
Dept. of Commerce Bureau of Public Roads, Washington, D.C. 1956 
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The second project of interest is a low-cost housing project financed 
by the United Nations in various countries of Central America. In this 
project the same basic design of low cost houses was built in various 
areas of three South American countries, some by contractors, and some by 
direct labour methods. Though further study would be necessary in order 
to ascertain the exact differences in the situation between various sites, 
from the figures immediately available it appears that, though there is 
some increase in material costs that is unexplained, the labour content 
of doing the work by direct supervised methods is no higher than where a 
contractor was employed. 
The lesson to be learned from these, and other examples of projects 
constructed without a prime contractor, is not so much that the system of 
management is less costly, but it appears to be no more so, and the system 
has many added advantages from an administrative point of view. 
The most obvious advantage of the direct labour system of construction 
is the reduced time that implementation can start. Drawings and contract 
documents do not have to be prepared to the extent necessary for prime 
contracts and the tendering and sometimes excessive appraisal and award 
period is avoided. This in itself can contribute substantial cost savings. 
Another advantage is that the day-to-day site control is in the hands of 
the owner or his direct representative who can make allowances for such 
circumstances as late delivery of materials, unforeseen construction 
conditions and changes in design with a minimum of disruption to the 
overall programme - something a prime contractor may not be able to do for 
lack of information, financial considerations, lack of management foresight 
or in some cases a wish to put the owner "on the block," 
Some less obvious advantages are also accrued to the owner by this system 
of construction. The most interesting is the educational experience 
gained by the staff of the augmenting agency (particularly its technical 
designers and administrators) in having to carry out the day-to-day field 
management of the project. It is recognized that agencies that carry out 
any large part of these operations in this manner produce more realistic 
designs and have a greater facility for accurate cost estimating than ones 
that leave this work to others.(1) Other advantages are the ability of the 
agency to augment directly such political policy decisions as labour- 
intensive work and local preference without having to do so by means of 
contract requirements which are hard to administer and are sometimes 
overruled by financial expediency. 
The major problem with this system of management is the shortage of 
qualified technical administrators available to the augmenting agency and 
the ability of their existing overburdened bureaucracy to handle it. These 
shortages are discussed in the later part of this section and some 
(1) See the comments on this matter contained in Section 7. 
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recommendations put forward, however, it has been the author's 
experience that the government and semi-government agencies with which 
he has been associated have within their staff or available to them much 
untapped talent in this regard who are made unavailable through mis- 
management of their personnel. 
The largest deterrent to the use of direct labour in this type of construction 
is the inbred prejudice against it mainly by the construction industry, 
(this prejudice is understandable as it is a blow to their livelihood) 
and by the international lending organizations who still cling to the 
concept that competitive tendering will automatically produce a minimum 
total cost package. This has not been demonstrated to the author's 
sati sfaction. 
The last method of construction considered is that of self-help or volunteer 
labour. It is only considered in order to keep this section complete and 
because it is a concept much discussed in the literature and beloved of 
philosophic writers on the subject of development aid. It is not 
considered a realistic method of carrying out the majority of development 
projects. 
With the exception of self-help housing projects, where the worker is 
producing a tangible product for himself and not for the community, 
the author's experience, and that of many others who have had experience in 
this field, is that such projects are beset with untold administrative 
problems and avoidable delays. The same work would be more 
efficiently carried out by some method of subsidized labour (if necessary 
in the form of food) or work brigades. Particularly if expensive equipment 
is involvedjthese projects become exceptionally extensive and 
administratively complex. 
There are of course many reports of community water supplies, rural roads or 
schools being successfully completed using such "barn-raising" techniques, 
however, they only appear to be successful in those countries where there is 
an inborn community spirit, an authoritarian form of local government or a 
very strong personality involved. These projects may be successful the 
first time, but once the novelty wears off, the work goes on without money 
and/or food coming in, the enthusiasm flags, attendance drops and in many 
cases the job must be completed by conventional methods. 
As stated before, one field where self-help appears to be successful, 
though an administrative nightmare, is in housing. It is felt that this is 
because strict screening processes are usually involved and because the 
workers are building something that will revert to them personally and 
hence increase their personal wealth or status. The author's experience in 
this field, has admittedly been in countries where the native population 
is individualistic rather than community oriented and these opinions 
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may, therefore, be prejudiced. 
No matter what system of construction administration is used, be it a 
conventional prime-contract or its modifications, direct labour or self- 
help, there are three ways in which the supervision of the work (what might 
be called the field or administrative engineering) is carried out. The 
first, and in most development projects of any size the most common, is for 
the augmenting authority to appoint a consulting engineer, (normally but 
not always the designer of the project) as representative of the owner,to 
administer and control the construction phase. In the case of formal 
construction contracts he is appointed the Engineer under the contract and 
has legal duties and responsibilities as such. In the case of direct 
labour and self-help projects he becomes agent for the owner and acts on^ 
his behalf under a variety of legal and financial arrangements between him 
and the owner. 
The second method is for the owner or the augmenting authority to carry out 
his own supervision either with his own in-house staff or by setting up a 
separate organizational department for this purpose. In many developing 
countries the latter would be preferred but due to shortages of 
manpower and financial resources, the first method has to be employed. 
The major objection to the traditional design/construct supervision method 
is that the design consultants (particularly smaller companies) do not always 
have on their staff experienced construction engineers and also, having 
designed the facility they tend to be prejudiced in the adjudicationof the 
contractor's complaints with regard to design and administration problems. 
It has also been pointed out thatr^ const ruction supervision Js not js ^financially 
remunerative to des ign engineering companies as design work, with the result 
that these companies do not devote full resources to such activities. 
The third administrative system, which is gaining popularity in North 
America and elsewhere, is the use of specialized construction management 
personnel or teams who have extensive experience in the field of construction 
management, but normally do not themselves become engaged in design or 
construction. In some cases these organizations take over responsibility for 
the management of both the design and construction phases, where the 
arrangement is called "project management" and in other cases they have the 
responsibility for the construction phase only and i;s called "construction 
management". The mechanics of these methods of construction are well 
documented, (1) however, they prove themselves particularly useful where the 
contracts are small and numerous or where the system of direct labour as 
discussed earlier are involved. One reason that this type of administrative 
system has not been used in overseas development work is the lack of firms 
specializing in development construction management in developing countries, 
(1) "Construction Management Contracts" £ "Project Management Contracts" 
- Canadian Construction Association, Ottawa. 
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the reluctance on the part of overseas governments to change from 
traditional design/construct arrangements and their feeling that they would 
be losing control of expenditure unless a duplication of supervisory 
staff is provided. 
The compromise recommendations contained herein, it is hoped will over- 
come some of the disadvantages of these various systems, but before putting 
them forward it is necessary to look closely at the two organizations with 
which any supervisor would have to deal - the existing contracting industry 
and the civil service bureaucracy within the augmenting agency. 
The construction industry in developing countries has been the subject of 
many studies/(1) and it varies in size and sophistication from countries such 
as Korea and the Philippines where local construction companies are capable 
of bidding on international tenders down to some countries where the local 
contractors are no more than tradesmen/house builders. With such disparity 
it is hard to generalize, however the following observations appear valid 
in the majority of cases. 
Though in some countries there is undoubtedly a shortage of technical 
personnel and skilled craftsmen, it i s at a sub-professional and foreman 
level that the greatest shortage in manpower exists. This is due to over- 
specialization and overtraining of professional engineers, immigration to the 
metropolitan countries of the more aggressive tradesmen, a social bias 
against the construction industry except as an entrepreneur and a shortage 
of formal or on-site training facilities for these lower levels of 
supervision. Personal observation of specific construction operations in 
the West Indies (block laying, pipe laying etc.) has shown that the actual 
production of craftsmen over short periods is not much below North American 
standards, however over longer periods the production falls off rapidly due 
to supervisory breakdowns (running out of materials), poor scheduling, and 
inefficient planning - all the duty primarily of the foreman and the 
supervisory staff rather than the craftsman himself. 
The number of local contractors, particularly of a small size¿ is far 
greater than the economy or market can bear. The majority of these are 
of necessity part-time contractors, sometimes waiting months or even 
years between jobs. They are under-financed, under-equipped and though 
in many cases technically competent, fall easily victim to cash flow and 
other administrative problems. 
(1) "Promotion of Construction Industry in Developing Countries" de Wilde 
& Assoc. I.B.R.D. Washington, D.C. 197^ 
Building Information Series #1-9. Intermediate Technology Development 
Group London 197^ 
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Though there are many examples of expatriate construction companies 
competing successfully with local organizations, it is more in the field 
of specialized sub-trades and large-scale projects requiring a high 
financial content that such companies specialize. In small infra- 
structure type work, they normally cannot compete for want of local know- 
ledge, high overhead costs and, more important, access to the "grapevine", 
through which labour, material, and political problems are often avoided, 
Profit margin by contractors in developing countries is much higher than 
would be expected in North America (admitted figures of 30¾ are not 
uncommon against an equivalent of 10-15¾). Expatriate contractors have 
always expected profits of this magnitude on overseas work and local 
contractors may tend to copy this lead, however the overabundance of 
contractors in the majority of countries and a low volume of work make 
high mark-up a necessity to pay for often idle equipment and continuing 
overheads. It is also true that estimating techniques by all but a very 
few of these contractors are little more than guesses, sometimes being 
made by professional estimators not acquainted with the contractors, and- 
the high profit mark-up is necessary to cover errors and ignorance in these 
estimates. 
The award of contracts is often more of a lottery than the result of true 
competitive tendering, and is considered as such by the contractors; 
contracts are awarded, if not to political contributors at least to the 
contractor who made most errors in his tender. The result is that 
contractors often consider that the award is merely a 'foot-in-the-door' 
and a convenient place from which to negotiate satisfactory prices which 
would not embarrass the owner but would give the contractor a satisfactory 
profit:. Claims and extras-are negotiated for on the same basis as orangesj 
in a market and any attempts to rationalize such payments are considered 
most unfair practice. Despite protestations of innocence and attempts 
by outside organization to require pre-tender qualifications, engineers 
independent estimates, and other window dressing the system appears to 
persist and is accepted at a practical if not an official level. 
The more experienced and better qualified contractors in many countries, 
knowing of these problems and those discussed hereafter, tend to avoid 
possible involvement in development work particularly rural development, 
concentrating more on the private sector and leave the public development 
in the hands of the more politically oriented and sometimes less qualified 
organizations. 
Having discussed the condition of much of the construction industry in 
developing countries,the bureaucracies with which they have to involve 
themselves will be considered. 
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Civil services are overcrowded and inefficient in most countries but in 
many underdeveloped countries this has become an art-form that is 
sometimes unbelievable. Any system which is designed to produce timely 
and economical results must bypass as much as possible of the 
inefficiency inherent in these organizations. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to investigate the reasons for this 
phenomenon but to point out that this represents one of the main sources 
of delay and overrun in the cost of project implementation. Nor is it the 
purpose of this paper to suggest methods of reducing such bottlenecks, if 
such were possible. A school of thought, not without merit, is that such 
bureaucracies are necessary to alleviate the chronic unemployment 
amongst the overeducated high school graduates that many of these countries 
produce. 
To the construction manager, whose primary task is the augmentation of a 
project, it is necessary to devise systems whereby the holdup and 
additional cost inherent in such conditions can be minimized. The areas 
in which delays (and hence cost overruns) occur are as follows: 
1. Pre-construction decision making 
2. Awards of contracts 
3. Day-to-day construction administration 
4. Final ization of payments 
5. Material and equipment acquisition 
Each of these will be considered separately: 
1. With regard to pre-construction decision making it is not only the 
local bureaucracy but also that of the international lending agencies 
that cause delays and additional costs. On one project, financed by 
such an institution, the author was aware of at least three conducted 
tours of the proposed site arranged for the officials of the organization 
because of the appointment of new "projeet officers", new consulting 
teams, etc. (It is interesting to note that during the construction phase 
of the project so 1 ittle interest was shown that no such tours were 
organized). Such financial organizations, as well as local ministries, 
frequently require detailed questionnaires, organizational rearrangements 
and other preconditions of release of money that are often outside the 
technical and manpower resources of the augmenting agencies. 
These problems, it is admitted, are outside the scope of construction, however 
the proposed solutions to the points 2-5 below would also alleviate to a 
great extent the delays caused in this early stage of the project. 
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2. Delays of up to six months between tenders being received and the 
award of the contracts on relatively minor development projects have been 
experienced. Such time is taken up on tender reviews, evaluation reports 
to contract sub-committees, ministries reports and a host of other 
formalities. Though it is appreciated that some tender evaluation is very 
necessary, this time-consuming operation could be reduced. In many cases 
the tenders run out and have to be renegotiated, and experienced 
contractors knowing of such delays in award in advance tend to either 
avoid such work or increase their tenders accordingly. 
3. Construction is a rapidly moving activity and not suited to set rules, 
regulations and procedures - problems have to be solved and decisions made 
at a field level, and except in some technical matters, the majority of the 
problems is of a straightforward and administrative nature requiring 
inventiveness and resourcefulness rather than technical competence. This 
is true not only on the part of the contractor but also the engineer 
and the owner with whom he is working. It requires a particular 
individualistic type of person and necessitates financial trust and 
responsibility to be placed at a relatively low level in the staff structure. 
Successful constructional organizations, be they contractors, engineers or 
construction branches of operating agencies, have real i zed and attracted 
such people in all countries. Such people however, are seldom found in 
formal civil service structures which are more geared to regulatory and 
operational problems rather than the entrepreneurial requirements of 
construction. Such civil service organizations therefore tend to look at 
each claim as a financial disaster and at each petty day-to-day decision 
as worthy of numerous reports, recommendations and further procrastination. 
Although some service departments of governments (public works departments, 
water authorities, etc.) are notoriously good in the field of contract 
administration, the ministries to which they are responsible and who 
maintain strict financial control over them, are often burdened with the 
full horror of bureaucratic delay and lack of administrative decision 
making. 
A. To organizations who are sometimes many years behind in their annual 
financial statements, finalizing a construction contract, particularly one 
encumbered with such problems as delays, extensions of time and claims for 
additional work, becomes a major undertaking and the response is often to 
put off the evil hour. The resultant delay in settlement to contractors 
causes additional costs, if not in that project at least on the next tender. 
Again it is a lack of decision making authority at an executive administrative 
level that is responsible rather than the lack of finances or manpower that 
is often claimed. 
5. The problems associated with the acquisition of materials and equipment 
are probably the biggest and most prevalent reasons for cost and time 
overruns in development projects overseas, For good reason the 
responsibility for such acquisition often rests with the augmenting 
government agency rather than the contractor and because of this, is 
inflicted with the administrative delays inherent in such an organization. 
The problem is so basic to any discussion of cost and time that a whole 
section of this paper will be devoted to it. Suffice to say that the 
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proposal set forth will, if not solve this recurring problem, reduce 
the immense delays and cost overruns at present being caused by this 
facet of the construction organization. 
Having considered the possible management techniques available and the 
problems associated with the construction industry and the bureaucracies 
with which they are involved, it is possible to recommend a procedure 
which should minimize these costly problems and provide a vehicle to 
augment projects more economically. 
The first requirement of the system is that the authority for day-to-day 
construction decisions both technical, financial and administrative be 
placed at a level where these can be made quickly, and such persons should 
be unencumbered by other bureaucratic responsibilities. Such a person and 
his staff should have the technical competence to carry out the necessary 
scheduling, ordering, and other augmenting duties necessary to ensure 
smooth construction activity and make alternative arrangements without 
recourse to higher authority except for major financial, political or 
technical commitments. Finally such an organization must only be set up 
for the duration of the project and "self destruct" on its successful 
complet i on. 
It is suggested that the construction of overseas infrastructure development 
projects be constructed under a form of project management using a modified 
system of direct labour. 
A project manager should be a high calibre construction engineer, preferably 
responsible directly to the augmenting agency but also in direct communication 
with the financial institution involved. This person could in many cases 
be seconded from the civil service of the country involved, could be from 
a private organization or hired directly by the augmenting or financial 
agency. There are available in many countries competent people of this 
calibre within and outside government organizations and the necessity to use 
expatriates should not arise in most cases. 
The project manager should report to the augmenting agency only at the 
highest level and all decisions affecting the construction management 
should be his alone. Whether he should also be responsible for the design 
stage is doubtful but may be considered. He should, however, be responsible 
for all material and equipment acquisition using existing government 
facilities only if it is considered expedient. On larger projects the 
necessary staff would have to be provided, however this staff should be kept 
to a minimum, as experience is that the quality of such administration 
decreases with its size and its eventual liquidation becomes more of 
a problem. In some cases the organization can be responsible for more than 
one project, however this should only be done if no additional staff will 
be required. 
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The possibility of this management team being responsible to the financial 
organization directly has been considered, but much as this has 
administrative advantages, it is considered politically impractical. The 
recommended procedure would be for the personnel Of this organization to 
be seconded from the local government or its agencies or recruited on 
contract for the project only. Another possibility would be to obtain 
the services of an experienced contractor on a fee basis. 
The project manager would have financial control of expenditures within 
strict limits set by the augmenting agency or the financial lending 
institution and within these limits carry out all the work, by contract, 
by direct labour, or a combination of these so as to suit the changing 
conditions imposed upon him. Contracts would not be of a "prime" nature 
but only for specialized type of work or smaller piece-work. Equipment 
would be bought or rented directly by the manager and material ordering 
and expediting his responsibility. Most important, the day-to-day 
scheduling and site organization would be in his hands rather than in 
those of a variety of contracting organizations. 
The relationship between the construction organization and the design 
engineers will be such that the designers will be "design consultants" 
being consulted on any technical matter or design changes and being 
paid on a time basis. Their involvement in the construction administration 
would thus be limited. 
The involvement of an augmenting agency would also be reduced except at 
the highest financial and technical level. There would however have to be 
certain consultations on operational and admtmstralrive problems at lower 
levels, and use could be made of their service organizations if this was 
considered by the project manager to be expedient. 
In order to avoid this construction team growing into its own civil- 
service empire, as has happened with such organizations in the past, it is 
necessary that it be dissolved at the successful completion of the 
construction project for which it was organized. Failure of such a closure 
will only ultimately lead to all the frustrations and inefficiencies that 
such an organization was meant to avoid. 
Further details of the make-up of this proposed organization are contained 
in the appendix to this paper. 
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Administrative systems such as described above have been used in various 
overseas development projects previously and some have been particularly 
successful, ( 1 ) however if.-anything can*be learnt from them, the failure to 
fully reach their potential can be attributed to one of the following 
reasons : 
1. Too tight a control of the organization by the responsible agency 
or ministry, resulting in the bureaucratic indecisions discussed 
previously. 
2. The organization growing in size and complexity so as to become its 
own bureaucratic problem area. 
3. Senior personnel within the organization (usually civil service 
secondments) unwilling to make the necessary decisions and take the 
responsibility for such decisions. 
k. Additional responsibilities being foisted onto the organization (with 
or without additional staff) until the project manager becomes the 
manager of an organization rather than of a construction project. 
5. Letting prime contracts in the traditional manner so that the project 
manager becomes no more than a policeman (or the traditional Resident 
Engineer) and the advantages he has of day-to-day organization of the 
project are lost. 
It is appreciated that the organizational method of construction proposed 
will be unpopular to nearly all those involved. The contractors will not 
like the responsibility, and hence the profit involved, in day-to-day 
construction managing being taken from them. The augmenting agencies will 
not like the control of funds and the resultant status being wielded by 
someone or some organization outside their normal chain of command. The 
financial lending instiiutions^wiJJ. notJike to involve themselves in the 
augmenting of projects, a field that they have hitherto avoided. The 
local politicians wi 11." consider--the involvement of the financial agency as 
an infringement on their sovereignty and even the seconded civil servant, 
no matter how well qualified, may not relish the position of project manager, 
as he may consider it taking him out of the civil-service mainstream. 
However, the people who should be pleased and to whom such an organization 
would be of benefit are the people for whom the facility is being built, as 
such a organization will produce the facility in a shorter time and at a 
lesser cost than the traditional methods. 
(1) Sites & Services Project - Jamaica Ministry of Housing financed by 
I.B.R.D. 
SECTION FIVE 5-1 
THE MATERIALS PROBLEM 
In any discussion with people Involved with the construction of overseas 
projects the one problem that appears to be universal is that of materials 
and equipment delivery. In many instances it is quoted as the only real 
cause of delays and construction overruns. Where the problem is solved 
(by ordering twice as much as necessary twice as early) the additional 
cost is borne by the project. There are unlimited examples of material 
and equipment being delayed, misshipped or lost on wharves, of equipment 
idle for years for lack of parts or of factories or treatment plants held 
up for months because of short-shipment (or loss) of vital equipment. 
The problems appear to be three-fold :- 
1. Delays and confusion in the ordering of materials and equipment 
2. Shipping and expediting problems 
3. Import restriction and articles "lost on wharf". 
It is a common practice on overseas development projects for the augmenting 
agency to buy the necessary material and equipment well ahead of actual 
construction and supply this to the contractor. The reasons for this are 
valid and considering the long lead time usually required, justified. 
Some of the agencies however, do not order their material or equipment 
directly, but through some central government purchasing agency. These 
agencies have been set up on the assumption that they could, by bulk 
purchasing, get better prices and by taking purchasing decisions away 
from individual civil servants reduce the possibi1ity of graft. Both are 
admirable reasons but because of the del aysf errors and . inef fici eneios 
that appear to be"the standard of nearly ail of these agencies it is 
doubtful whether any money is saved. 
The majority of materials and equipment required on development projects 
■is spec i a 1 i zed or even 'one-of-a-kind' and little or no advantage can be 
obtained from bulk buying programmes, and where bulk purchases may be 
advantageous, (for asphalt^ pipes, cement etc.) stock piles of material are 
usually kept on hand. As for the reduction of graft it is doubtful whether 
the savings are worth the time lost by using them or whether the employees 
of the purchasing agency are any more resistant than others. 
One result of the purchasing agency problem is delays up to six months in 
placing orders, another is errors in orders due to the non-technical 
placing of these orders and yet another is incompatibility of equipment 
due to these agencies calling for tenders on equipment and awarding them on 
the basis of price rather than technical specification. 
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When materials for projects have to be purchased through an Aid agency, as 
in many tied-aid arrangements, problems also exist. It is not the intention 
of this paper to discuss the merits of tied-aid of this type, but only to 
point out some of the technical problems that have been experienced because 
of this arrangement. The most obvious and serious problem is that of 
incompatibility - the case of the many-bulbed treatment plant is a good 
example. Another recurrent problem is the supply of equipment by a donor 
country for which spares are not available locally, for which there is no 
local agent or which requires a high level of technical expertise not 
available in the recipient country. 
It should also be pointed out that the purchasing and expediting facilities 
in donor countries offered by certain aid agencies are no better than those 
to be found in undeveloped countries, having within them not only the same 
delays due to bureaucratic procrastination but also the added confusion of 
long and unreliable lines of communication. 
The problem with respect to shipping and expediting is largely one of 
personnel. The job of material expediting (like that of store-keeping) is 
too important to be left to the minor clerk and other personnel considered 
unfit for other duties, yet it is precisely this type of person who fills 
these jobs both in underdeveloped and developed countries. Material and 
equipment expediting is an exacting, full-time position requiring high 
calibre people with both experience and a dedication to a frustrating and 
often thankless job. The expediter must keep in constant contact with all 
the cargo for which he is responsible, arrange necessary or alternative 
methods of transport and also keep the project management informed of 
realistic delivery dates and possible delays. As well as this he must be 
able within his technical competence, to spot missing or incorrect shipments, 
incompatibi1 ities and other potential problems prior to the arrival of the 
material. All too often this exacting task is given to some retainer, 
working out his pension, or to a junior clerk who can do little more than 
match up order numbers. In many cases these cargo expediters are 
responsible, not to the augmenting agency but to some other administrative 
branches of government causing further communication and management 
problems. One result of the above is that many material problems that 
could have been solved or at least mitigated are not known of until too 
late and costly delays result. Another related problem is that project 
management spends a disproportionate amount of its time carrying out these 
functions rather than their prime job of running the on-site construction 
activity. 
Recently the author carried out a time study on himself while managing a 
development construction project and, found that 30 percent of his active 
(non-travelling) time was spent on material and equipment expediting 
activities. (Closely following, it may be added, by about 20 percent of 
his time looking and waiting for files), 
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It must also be appreciated that, except where political pressures are 
brought to bear in the metropolitan countries on fabricators or exporters, 
small-scale orders to developing countries often have low priority for such 
companies. This often accounts for the apparent excessive delivery times 
quoted, and the many extensions of such delivery times subsequently 
imposed. It is felt that little can be done to mitigate this at the project 
level, however, financing agencies should take it into account when 
involving themselves in the expediting and shipping of such materials. 
Closely related to the problem of expediting and shipping materials is that 
of the clearing of materials off the wharf, through the necessary 
customs etc., and getting them to the site. How often have materials 
arrived only to be lost on the wharf or held up because of customs 
clearance? It is told that the situation in one African country gets 
so bad that every so often all material still on the wharf is bulldozed 
into the sea to make way for more cargo. This may or may not be true, but 
to anyone having experienced the confusion, red-tape and incompetence 
prevalent at the wharves in some developing countries it is not inconceivable. 
The amazing situation however, is that government goods (for which there is 
no duty or customs to be paid) fare no better. There are many instances 
where the payment involved has been relatively small, that it has been 
found faster to clear materials or equipment as private goods and pay the 
necessary duty than to wait for the government process to obtain the 
articles duty-free. 
In many cases the problem here again is one of personnel, as the job of 
finding materials on the wharf and clearing them through the necessary 
formalities is often given to someone who has not the technical ability 
nor the personal drive for such an exacting and demanding task. It is not 
within the scope of this paper to try to suggest methods of clearing up the 
mess on dock areas in the many countries receiving overseas aid, in fact it 
is doubtful whether any realistic solutions can be found, however, it is 
felt that if costs and time are to be reduced on the implementation of 
development projects some method of bypassing or accelerating these 
procedures must be found. 
It appears universal that the wharf is a principal area of graft and that 
without its use of such "black-money" it is just about impossible to 
liberate materials. Private companies operating in developing countries 
find early that in order to survive they must provide a short-circuit to 
this system, and they either hire themselves competent dynamic and 
productive personnel to do their cargo clearance and expediting duties 
or more commonly hire private custom brokerage houses to do these for a 
sometimes exorbitantly high fee, presumably including the necessary graft. 
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It is suggested that the most expedient way to try and bypass these 
major bottlenecks is for the responsibi1ity for these duties (purchasing 
and expediting) to be placed with the project manager as suggested 
previously in section k and to hire the necessary highly qualified 
(and highly paid) personnel for this purpose. This person could also 
be responsible for wharf clearance and finding cargo, however, it is 
suggested that these latter duties would better be carried out by a 
well-established local firm of custom brokers. 
Once the responsibility for the material and acquisition duties has been 
placed in this one location such refinements as local preference, donor 
country content and the like can be control led and supervised by other 
agencies but the actual ordering, expediting and handling carried out by 
this independent organization. An added advantage of placing these 
responsibilities with the project manager would be his ability to use 
first-hand knowledge of the materials and equipment situation in the 
scheduling of the site work itself. 
It is appreciated that such an arrangement would not be popular with the 
government purchasing organizations whether they be in the donor or 
recipient country, however, if a realistic attempt is to be made to reduce 
construction time and cost, these inefficient organizations must be 
bypassed. The relatively small savings that may be obtained by using these 
larger organizations are more than compensated for by the savings in delay 
that have been obtained where the independent procurement procedures have 
been used successfully. 
SECTION SIX 
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MANPOWER AND MACHINE POWER MANAGEMENT 
One facet of the construction of overseas development projects that has 
received considerable resurgence of notice recently is the use of labour- 
intensive methods - particularly for earthworks such as road building, 
canals, etc. Much study (1) has been done particularly by the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Labour Office, 
and the Intermediate Technology Group and much on-site work is being done 
in this area particularly in India, Indonesia and in the Philippines. The 
work in India (particularly the use of the Land Army) (2) and in the 
Philippines (3) (Work Brigades) are worthy of further study. 
The majority of research has been done into the economic viability of 
such construction methods but also to a lesser extent into the use of labour- 
intensive tools, materials and other facets of the problem. In the Land 
Army, the work in Indonesia and particularly the work of the Bureau of 
Public Highways in the Philippines the problem of the administration 
ofthis work is also being closely examined. 
Though there are certain conflicts in the conclusions reached in the various 
reports on this subject, from an economic point of view the consensus 
appears that, under certain circumstances certain parts of projects can be 
constructed competitively by labour-intensive methods. The actual level and 
extent of labour-intensive activity is dependent on local cost comparisons, 
ground conditions and, as pointed out in section 2 of this paper, the design. 
Much use is made in these analyses of "shadow" or "social pricing" concepts 
to produce economic justification for the use of labour-intensive construction 
However, discussions with administrators in countries that are presently using 
such methods together with some of those of major international development 
organizations, indicate that at present only lip service at best is being 
paid such economic niceties and that labour-intensive methods are being used 
(1) "Substitution of Labour and Equipment in Civil Construction" - Harrel 
et al. I.B.R.D. Washington, D.C. 197^- 
"Study of Substitution of Labour and Equipment in Civil Construction." 
- Scott, Wilson, Kirpatrick & Partners for I.B.R.D. Washington, D.C. 197^ 
"Roads and Re-distribution" I.L.O. 
"Men or Machines" Depac Lai. et al. I.L.O. 
(2) "A Land-Army Project in Karnataka - India" W.G. Donavan, Development 
Digest October 1973- 
(3) Labour Intens i ve.Technology - Bureau of Public Highways-Manila. 
(k) For the best introduction to the concept and use of "shadow" or "social" 
economic costing methods see 
"Guidelines for Identifying 6 Implementing Projects to Reduce Costs in 
Public Construction in Developing Countries - Arthur D. Little Inc. 
Cambridge, Mass. for I.A.D. Washington, D.C. 
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as a political expediency rather than because of any economic justification. 
Where any economic justification may be attempted, it appears to be based 
mainly on market rather than social pricing methods. The concept of shadow 
pricing, though not too complex to understand on an intellectual level, is 
hard to explain in realistic terms to local profit-oriented building contractors, 
far less to the average tax payer. 
The traditional contract method of construction is not applicable or 
realistic for the administration of labour-intensive work. Most contractors 
are not prepared (and quite rightly so) to quote binding prices on work where 
the labour force may be unreliable in both quality and quantity, where slight 
fluctuation in weather and ground conditions can cause large changes in 
productivity or where they are caught in the stranglehold of political or union 
activity. Also the logistic problems involved in housing, transporting, 
directing and caring for large labour forces are often outside the scope of 
competence of all but the largest of contractors. The best that can be 
expected is for labour-only type contracts given to village headmen and the 
like and piece- or task-work arrangements where relatively small and simple 
contracts are involved, and the management of the construction projects in 
general remains outside the control of the contractor. 
One of the most comprehensive studies on the administration of labour-intensive 
construction has been done by the Bureau of Public Roads of the Philippines. (1) 
Their manual on the subject goes in great length into such fields as the size 
of crew, times of work, effects of weather and other such parameters. Their 
productivity rates, based largely on a pilot road project in Central Luzon, 
are most interesting when compared to the results that are obtained in other 
reports. There appear to be wide differences in production rates from project 
to project and from country to country due to various parameters such as those 
quoted above which can be qualtified, but more important are two factors which 
cannot be so easily measured and on which more research work must be done. 
Those are supervision and manpower motivation. 
An aspect of labour-intensive operations that is experienced in many countries 
where it is being re-introduced is the non-availability of supervisors 
experienced in this type of construction. The administrative 
(1) Manual of Construction of Roads by Labour-intensive Methods 
- Bureau of Public Roads - Manila (unpublished) 
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skills required for control 1 ing and managing large labour forces appear 
to have died out and the younger supervisors do not wish to involve 
themselves in this "low-status" branch of the industry. This is 
unfortunate, as the quality of such supervision and a dedication on its part 
to make this method of construction competitive is a most important 
requirement. 
It is well documented that production rates over short periods (days) 
sometimes increase over 100 percent when piece work or task work is 
substituted for day work, but whether this increase can be sustained, 
either from a physical or social standpoint, when one is dealing with 
societies inwhich monetary gain is not al1 - important, has not been fully 
explored. The, author has had experiences of large production rates by 
task work for a short period of days after which the limited labour force is 
no longer interested in further work. The average daily production over the 
days worked and days not worked resuLted in no more than would have been 
obtained under a day work basis, when the schedule disruption on equipment 
and other work would not have been so great. 
There is also a problem of providing incentives to ensure that labour- 
intensive methods are used whenever possible. This can be by taxation and 
subsidy or by legal requirements within the construction contract. No 
indication can be found as to whether either of these methods has proved 
successful. The records show that labour-intensive work is usually 
carried out either where the marketplace economics make it justifiable, 
or where government organized direct-labour projects have employed high 
percentages of labour as a political policy rather than an economic decision. 
The latter situations tend to become "make-work" social welfare projects 
rather than true attempts to construct-fáci l i ties in a-workmanli ke manner 
using a maximum of labour. It is the bad publicity often piventhese projects 
that gives labour-intensive work the poor connotation that it has had in the 
past. 
Interesting work has been done by the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development in the study of the health of labourers in developing 
countries.(1 ) Intervention experiments by giving iron supplements to workers 
have been tried and spectacular increases of about 30 percent in the 
productivity rates have been obtained. There are, however, no indications 
of large-scale use of this method of increasing production and of course, 
it is no substitute for a general nutritional improvement in diet which 
would produce the same result. It is understood that a supplement food 
programme was instigated by the contractor on the Mangla Dam project in 
Pakistan, but no details of the cost, administration or effect of this 
programme have been obtained. 
(1) "Nutrition £ Health of Indonesian Construction Workers" - Karyadi & 
Basta I.B.R.D. Washington, D.C. 
"Iron Deficiency Anemia and the Productivity of Adult Males in Indonesia" 
Basta I.B.R.D. Washington, D.C. 
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It is expected that projects involving labour-intensive work, though not 
without mechanical content, will become more common in the future and that 
certain countries will demand it for aid projects for political rather 
than for economical reasons. Not only do such projects re-distribute 
wealth within the developing countries, reduce underemployment and use more 
local resources, but they also ensure that a greater percentage of the aid 
money remains within the local economy. 
Because of the reluctance of contractors to bid labour-intensive work 
in the traditional manner, the high political factors involved in its 
organization and other factors, the management of these projects is 
best carried out under a modified direct labour system supervised by a 
competent project manager, as suggested in Section 4 of this paper. 
The operation of construction equipment is an expensive undertaking at 
any time and more particularly~in underdeveloped-countries where skilled 
manpower is at a premium, communication difficult and the supply of spare 
parts limited. Despite this, the range and extent of heavy equipment to be 
found in such countries is amazing. The availability factor, however, 
is low due to breakdowns and poor operational technique and the use factor 
also low due to underuti1 ization. These factors tend to further increase 
the cost of such equipment. Added to this are high import duties which, 
even in the case of development work for which duty-free equipment can 
be imported, is reflected in the high cost of repairs and parts. 
A well known international construction company admits to over-equipping 
overseas work to the extent of 50 percent over North American requirements, 
due to excessive down--time, shortages of spares and local problems. This 
of course causes additional costs as only in the 1 arger or more-industrial i zed 
developed countries are modern leasing facilities available. 
Local contractors tend to invest in such equipment and try to recoup 
the total cost on one contract because of the uncertainty of obtaining 
continuing work. Where older equipment is used,continuing breakdowns, 
lack of spare parts and often indifferent maintenance procedures cause 
delays and hence additional costs. The anomalies caused by such high 
equipment rental rates are obvious when claims for standby rental on certain 
equipment,due to owner caused delays^are of sufficient magnitude to cover the 
new purchase price of the equipment. This situation appears not uncommon. 
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There have been various comprehensive studies of the problems associated 
with the use of such equipment in development work ( 1-) •. an*K this paper can only 
point out, that due to the additional cost factors, particularly the 
underuti1 ization of very specialized type of equipment, managers of 
development construction projects should approach with caution heavy 
commitments in this area. When such equipment is to be acquired, it should 
be of a simple multi-use type rather than specialized high-capacity 
machi nes. 
The availability of adequate spare parts is a problem common to equipment 
operation in any country, but even more so in developing countries, where 
all the acquisition problems discussed in Section 5 are encountered and 
where slow turn-over increases loss, wastage and inventory costs. In 
many cases it is easier and faster to import new equipment than obtain 
required spare-parts or carry out a major overhaul. 
For these reasons it is suggested that, where the size of the development 
project warrants it, construction equipment be purchased by the 
augmenting agency and rented to the contractors or used under direct 
labour conditions by the project manager. Such a procedure will ensure 
maximum duty-free benefits should such exist, and from experience, should 
provide reduced total costs, particularly if such equipment can be carried 
over from one project to another. The acquisition of the necessary spare 
parts and the carrying out of necessary major overhauls would also be his 
responsibility, using the facilities of government purchasing departments, 
private organizations or direct labour. Systems of this type are already 
being used with some success both in private development ventures overseas 
and in government-sponsored aid programmes. 
(1) Earthmoving by Manual Labour and Machines - United Nations - New York 
Achievement of Opportunities to Reduce Construction Costs in Public 
Highways - Republic of Philippines - Arthur D. Little Inc., Cambridge, 
Mass. 
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COST AND SCHEDULE CONTROL 
The last category of problems regularly encountered by those Involved in 
development construction is that of cost and schedule control. Too often 
additional costs and time overruns are the result of poor reporting 
techniques which cause those in a management position (and presumably able 
to exercise the authority to control or at least mitigate problems) not 
being notified of propsective problems until it is too late to take the 
necessary corrective action. 
An attack on this must be two-fold, - firstly reporting methods (and the 
information on which such reports are based) should be improved and speeded 
up, and secondly decision-making levels of authority should be lowered so 
that the necessary time lag between a problem being encountered and the 
necessary remedial action being taken is reduced. 
At present reporting techniques on the majority of overseas development 
projects are at best a method of presenting the existing cost and schedule 
status, and at worst a system by which, by means of half-truths, ambiguities 
or statistical double-talk, the situation with regard to the project (and 
in some cases the incompetence of those responsible for its implementation) 
is hidden. 
The majority of international lending agencies requires only financial 
reports and the most fragmentary and qualitative of schedule statements. 
Some, it is true have gone as far as to instigate complicated CPM/PERT 
based ^reporting techniques, but these have proved costly and ineffective 
mainly due to the inexperience of those people involved both in the 
input data and in interpreting the results. The inherent—problems of 
such sophisticated methods and their ability to hide more than they 
reveal make such techniques of little value in minor development projects, 
particularly in many developing countries where the concept of working 
on any schedule, be it the most simple of bar-charts, is uncommon. 
There is a distinction between "cost accounting" and "cost control", the 
former being a bookkeeping technique based on recording payments after 
they have been made - a matter of record keeping, while the latter a more 
complicated system whereby future anticipated costs are continually 
being forecast, reappraised and methods for their control being suggested. 
There is a similar distinction between a "schedule report" and "schedule 
control." 
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Most existing cost and schedule reports are based on the accounting format 
so that all that is reported is past performance and where any forecasting 
is attempted, it is cursory in nature and ineffective as a tool on which 
management decisions can be made. 
Not only is the factual content of these records such that little 
meaningful information can be obtained, but due to the time delay between 
the makeup of the report and its reaching anyone who can do something to 
relieve any foreseeable problems makes their usefulness suspect. This 
time delay is due not only to the effect of distance and poor communications 
but more important to the slow rate of bureaucratic activities through 
which such reports must filter before they reach high enough levels of 
management for remedial action to be taken. 
The result of these confused reporting techniques, together with the 
division of responsibility for augmentation discussed in Section 3 of 
this paper, is that the administration of the majority of developing 
construction projects is based on what might be called "crisis management" 
whereby problems are brought directly to the attention of senior management 
on an individual basis (usually in person because of the inefficiency of 
normal reporting procedures) and action taken on a priority basis. Not 
only does this involve the necessity for junior supervisors to continuously 
refer to senior management but also causes a large proportion of the latter's 
time to be spent in this "fire-fighting" role rather than carrying out 
long-range planning, making policy decisions and seeing that they are 
carried out, which should be its primary functions. The "civil service" 
attitude, traditional lack of authority delegation and internal communication 
difficulties inherent in many-of the augmenting authorities and discussed 
in Section 3 tend to aggravate this situation. 
The solution to the problem of cost and scheduling control therefore, 
must be to, first set up a reporting system that not only records accurately 
the financial and scheduled status of the project, but also forecasts 
future trends with regards to possible cost and schedule problems, second 
to ensure that such reports are conscientiously forwarded and third, to 
make the decision-making level of responsiblity close enough to the project 
and with sufficient authority so that the true situation with regard to 
the project can be seen and acted upon in a timely manner. 
To improve on the cost-report ing techniques would be a specialized 
assignment and would of course vary in detail from project to project and 
within augmenting authorities. It must, however, have within it a method 
whereby (whether by the use of unit costs, suspense accounts or otherwise) 
anticipated total costs and schedule changes can be forecast with 
sufficient lead time to allow for remedial action. The system should also 
provide worthwhile total cost records in a form suitable for future 
estimating purposes. 
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More study into the make-up of such cost control procedures should be 
instigated on a selective basis for various specific projects. 
With regard to schedule control, it is considered that a modern computer 
oriented reporting technique be not considered for infra-structure type 
development projects. Experience has shown that to use these as a 
regular schedule control method, as has successfully been done by some 
construction organizations, is not only ineffective but costly to operate 
in developing countries due to a lack of experienced personnel, available 
equipment and management enthusiasm. These techniques may however, have 
their place in the planning stage as a management tool in- the hands of 
experienced personnel if such are available, who appreciate their 
limitations and can evaluate their results. 
The regular scheduling reporting techniques suggested would be based on 
the most simple of bar-charts conversant with the complexity of the 
problem, but more important such a basic schedule must be realistic in 
the first place, must be adhered to by the people in the field and be 
updated whenever necessary so as continue as a realistic measure for the 
performance of the project. ATI too often the requirement of the 
contractor under the contract to produce a construction schedule is 
considered, both by him and unfortunately by the contract administrators, 
as a mere formality. It should be a detailed document, agreed to by all 
parties, through which progress can be judged and when diverged from 
should be re-.evaluted and reconstructed with the same attention as the 
original. 
The problems -associated--wi tb the delay -in obtaining schedule and cost - 
information on which to take remedial action would be greatly alleviated 
with the introduction of the "project managerMi concept and the use of a 
modified direct labour method of construction administration. This 
method of management would ensure that the people most intimately 
associated with the project would not only be very close to the instigation 
of the report (would in many cases be those making the feport) but also 
have the responsibility and authority to make the necessary changes. This 
method of administration would also fragment the project to the extent 
where necessary actions, such as rescheduling of work, redesign, expediting 
of materials or even political pressure can be taken without major 
disruption to other aspects of the work. Such actions would cause 
a prime-contractor to instigate claims procedures. 
in the field of cost and schedule reporting it is felt that the 
international lending and other financial organizations should take a 
lead,not only by requiring more realistic reporting procedures,but 
also to instigate their own independent evaluation of cost and schedule 
situations of the project during the construction phase rather than 
wait for problems to develop-by which time it is often too late to 
instigate remedial measures. 
There is another common reason for cost and schedule overruns which 
cannot be reduced by any form of improved site management, administrative 
organization or construction techniques, and that is errors in the 
original estimated costs and time forecasts. 
Apart from a closer examination of the qualification and experience of 
the persons making these original estimates - and in this regard the estimates 
made by recipient countries for development aid purposes are often 
suspect - an independent cost/schedule evaluation should be carried out. 
Such an evaluation should be done by a construction engineer rather than 
a design engineer and should be based on a total time/cost evaluation 
rather than unit prices and unit time methods so often used by design 
organizations and others not experienced in construction estimating 
techniques. Needless to say the person carrying out this independent 
evaluation should be independent of the designers and other interested 
parties. He should also be experienced in local conditions and construction 
methods employed in the area in question. 
It is anticipated that by obtaining realistic original schedule and 
cost estimates, by instigating useful and timely reports during the  
progress of the work and by having the necessary, responsibility and authority 
delegated to a project manager who is in receipt of such reports will help 
to overcome the present excessive cost and time increases being experienced^ 




PROPOSED PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
A. Responsibility-Authority Chart 
KEY 
  Lines of Authority/Responsibility 
—  Lines of Communication for 
Services & Consultation 
— = = Lines of Communication for 
Reporting. 
* Note 
The possibility of having the project management team responsible 
also for project design as well as construction has been rejected, 
as the latter requires different expertise. It is felt that control 
of the design aspects of the project would be better in the hands 
of the "in house" engineers of the Augmenting Agency. 
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C. Project Management Organization - Small Projects 
Note 
Under conditions such as above the project manager could be 
responsible for two or three minor projects, each of which 
would have its own full-time field supervisor» 
kk 
Project Manager's Authority & Responsibility 
Financial 
The Project Manager shall be able to make payments within approved 
budgets, for labour, contracts, supplies and minor equipment/material 
acquisition. 
The Project Manager shall award minor and/or specialized sub-contracts 
within budget limits. 
Contractual 
The Project Manager shall have authority to enter into, terminate 
and/or negotiate contracts for minor or specialized work contained 
in an approved budget. 
The Project Manager shall not have the authority to acquire land 
or rights-of-way but should work within existing government agencies 
set up for these purposes. 
Engineering 
The Project Manager shall have full authority of quality, cost and 
schedule control of the project. 
The Project Manager shall have direct access and authority to engage 
the designers on a fee basis (within stipulated limits) to carry out 
design or investigations with regard to the project. 
The Project Manager shall have authority £o make minor changes in 
project design with or without approval of designers or augmenting 
authority. 
Personnel 
The Project Manager shall have authority to transfer, engage and 
dismiss members of his staff below a specified level, and shall 
have authority to do so with senior members of his staff with prior 
approval of senior management of the augmenting agency. 
Reporting 
The Project Manager shall report at regular intervals (bi-weekly) 
to Senior Management of the augmenting agency on the financial, 
technical and schedule conditions of the project. Such report 
shall include details of any contract entered into, terminated or 
negotiated, changes of design instigated and any other decisions 
taken within his authority. 
The Project Manager shall report monthly to the financial agency 
involved (if different from the augmenting agency) on the financial 
and schedule conditions of the project. 
E. qualifications for Position of Project Manager 
(Depending on the size & complexity, the project manager could 
have less qualification than stated below which is based on a 
project of moderate complexity for which a staff of approximately 
ten to twelve people would be envisaged.) 
1- Professional qualifications as Engineer, Architect or Quantity 
Surveyor (lesser qualification would be acceptable if extensive 
project management experience has been accumulated). 
2. Ten years experience, preferably as a field supervisor or 
Resident Engineer rather than designer, academic or researcher. 
3. Previous exposure to cost & schedule control and the direction 
of labour and equipment. 
k. Sufficient maturity to inspire confidence not only in his staff 
but in senior management of the augmenting agency, the financial 
agency, contractors and the public. 
5« Proven fiscal and legal responsibility. 
6. Experience in working with bureaucratic government and quasi- 
government organizations without excessive frustration developing. 
7- Experience in working on development projects in underdeveloped 
countries, preferably with similar climatic, cultural and 
technical standards. The necesseity of having extensive experience 
in the type of development taking place (water supply, housing, 
roads) is not considered of paramount importance, though it would 
be an advantage. A broad background in augmenting development- 
oriented construction projects is considered of more importance. 
a6 
F. Pro.ject Budget 
In order for the Project Manager to operate as an independent 
organization, financial control by the augmenting agency or financial 
organization can only be obtained by him working within a comprehensive 
approved budget based on the original estimated cost of the project* 
Funds should be released to the Project Manager in accordance with this 
budget in lump sums depending on a time base or other schedule* Pay- 
ments by the Project Manager can only be made within the allocations of 
this budget and expenditure outside of it or in excess of it would 
require prior approval of the augmenting agency and/or the financial 
organization, depending on their particular interrelationship* 
To be workable, such a budget must be realistic and funds made available 
to the Project Manager in a timely manner, taking into account necessary 
pre-payment, mobilization costs and other non-time related funds. The 
following is an example of the headings under which budget allocation . 
could be made and an allocation schedule for a minor pumphouse-pipelines- 
reservoir water supply project: 
Item Description Allocation Schedule 
1* Pumping Equipment On equipment delivery* 
/ 2* Pipeline Material On material delivery* 
3* Construction Material On schedule basis 
Direct Labour On schedule basis 
5* Consumable Supplies On schedule basis 
6. Mobilization Costs At start of project 
7* Clean-up & Demobil- As requested 
ization Costs 
8. Specialized Sub-contract On awaj-d or time basis* 
9* Approved Contracts On award or time basis* 
10* Equipment Acquisition At start of project 
Costs 
11. Equipment Operation On schedule basis 
Costs 
12* Project Overhead Costs On schedule basis 
13« Minor Misc. Costs On schedule basis 
1½. Design Cost Contin- At start of project 
gencies 
15* General Contingencies As requested by Project 
Manager 
* Though funds for these items would not be released to the Project 
Manager at the beginning of the project, he would have the authority 
to purchase equipment/material or enter into contracts up to the 
amount covered in the budget, at any time necessary to ensure project 
scheduling* 
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MINIMUM COST - MINIMUM TIME 
SUPPLEMENT 
A draft copy of this report was given to various interested parties, 
particularly within the I.B.R.D. (World Bank) and the Canadian International 
Development Agency, for their comments. These have been much appreciated 
and various views and suggestions summarized below:- 
1. Development of Institutions 
It was the feeling of the majority of those who commented on the report, 
that the project management system advocated and most of the other methods 
suggested for accelerating construction work were too project oriented and 
did not give enough consideration to the building of permanent institutions, 
capable not only of augmenting this and other similar projects, but also 
to service, maintain and otherwise protect the capital investment involved. 
These critics were particularly those involved with international 
financing and aid organizations, and they are understandably more interested 
in long-term organizational reforms and the implementation of rational 
administrative procedures. 
It is interesting to note that this criticism, though voiced to a 
lesser extend by independent engineering consultants, is not considered 
important by most augmenting agencies themselves or by those directly 
involved in the construction procedures. These latter people do sometimes 
consider the organizational disarray within the existing organizational 
structures to be the major bottleneck towards augmenting these development 
projects in a timely manner. 
As pointed out in Section 1 of this paper, the recommendations 
contained in it are based on adapting existing operational structures 
rather than instigating any fundamental operational change. It is felt by 
the author that the social and political necessities for the majority of 
the infrastructure type programmes being undertaken is so pressing, that 
they should not be delayed in order to augment organizational changes that 
are in some cases politically unworkable and hence of doubtful long-term 
expediency. If it can be demonstrated that any particular system of 
management can produce results economically and on time, the local politi- 
cal and social factors will produce the administrative machinery to per- 
petuate it. In any case any organizational structure imposed from outside 
is doomed to failure unless there is an internal necessity for its 
creation. 
The development of organizations has, therefore, not been considered 
to any great extent within this paper - not because it would not in many 
cases be desirable, but because the necessary time involved to develop 
such organizations is in itself a major reason for cost and schedule 
overruns on development projects. 
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2. The Use of Non-Governmenta1 Agencies 
The proposal within this report to make use of non-governmental 
agencies for procurement, purchasing and expediting duties has been 
criticized by many. The criticism has been not so much that these 
organizations would not be more efficient but, rather that such arrange- 
ments would be politically unacceptable. 
This argument was expected, and considering the points of view ex- 
pressed in #1 above, it is indeed hard to defend a proposal not to use 
such existing organizations, however, it is felt that a case can be made 
that such existing government purchasing and expediting agencies were 
designed, and may be well suited, for long-term repetitious type of 
purchases of a routine nature but are not qualified for obtaining the 
one-of-a-kind technical products required for development projects and 
particularly not for obtaining these in an expeditious manner suitable 
for the demands of the construction industry. 
3. The Use of Direct Labour Construction Methods 
There have been certain comments that this paper appears to be 
recommending the use of direct-labour (in its traditional meaning) as the 
most economic method in administering development projects and there is 
understandably some disagreement as to whether this is justified. 
What this paper is recommending is that the administration and direc- 
tion of labour, equipment and material acquisition be under the control of 
the project manager and not necessarily that labour would be paid on the 
traditional daily-hire basis. In fact, it is recommended that labour 
payments would be an a piece-work or petty-contract basis. It is the 
organization and schedule of this labour that is felt should be taken out 
of the hands of prime contractors and not the method of payment. There 
are still certain cases, however, such as testing and repairing pipelines, 
where only a daily method of payment is practical. 
A. Increased Feasibility and Pre-Construction Studies 
It has been suggested that an increase in the scope and quality of 
feasibility and other pre-construction economic and engineering studies 
rather than changes to the method of augmentation would reduce the 
chances for schedule and cost overruns on development projects. 
Though it is undoubtedly true that an increase in the quality of 
pre-construction estimates will, by definition, reduce the amount of 
overruns, it has been the author's experience that overruns are as often 
caused by poor administration during construction than by unreliable 
estimates. It can, of course, be argued that a good estimator should 
foresee such mal-administration and allow for it in his estimate, however, 
such an attitude is not conducive to reducing unnecessary cost overruns. 
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lt is considered that the majority of development projects are at 
present over-engineered both at the conceptual and detailed design stage -
there is a possibil ity that they may also be over-estlmated. Not only 
does this over-engineering cost money, but the delays to the implementation 
caused by them are themselves a major contributor to additional cost, both 
in terms of direct outlay and loss of social amenities. 
5. Social Aspect of Construction Management 
A val id criticism of this paper has been that little or no regard has 
been paid to the social conditions under which the construction activities 
take place, and that no consideration has been given to the social well-
being and the 'quality of l ife 1 either of the labour force employed on 
the project or the population inhabiting the area, and for whom presumably 
the facility is being built. 
This facet of construction management, particularly with regard to 
his work force, is of the utmost importance to the manager of a construc-
tion project, and all experienced managers would pay particular attention 
to this aspect of their responsibility, both from a broad social aspect 
and from a more narrow educational one. This subject has, however, been 
given minor consideration in this paper, not because it is unimportant, 
but rather because it is one that has been studied to.a great extent 
(mainly by people not directly involved in project augmentation) and 
because in many cases 1t has been accentuated to the extent that the 
primary purpose of getting-the-work-done has been relegated to second 
place. 
As stated in #1 above, time and money is running out and all those 
involved in the field of development must decide whether the important 
aspect of the work is an educational one (with its possible paternalistic 
connotations) or a functional one. 
